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Informing laymen of security situations is a notoriously hard problem. Users are usually
not cognoscenti of all the various secure and insecure situations that may arise, and this can
be further worsened by certain visual indicators that instead of helping users, fail to convey
clear and unambiguous messages. Even in well established and studied applications, like
email clients providing end-to-end encryption, the problem seems far from being solved.
Motivated to verify this claim, we studied the communication qualities of four privacy
icons (in the form of coloured shapes) in conveying specific security messages, relevant for
a particular secure emailing system called p≡p. We questioned 42 users in three different
sessions, where we showed them 10 privacy ratings, along with their explanations, and asked
them to match the rating and explanation with the four privacy icons. We compared the
participants’ associations to those made by the p≡p developers.
The results, still preliminary, are not encouraging. Except for the two most extreme
cases, Secure and trusted and Under attack, users almost entirely missed to get the in-
dicators’ intended messages. In particular, they did not grasp certain concepts such as
Unsecure email and Secure email, which in turn were fundamental for the engineers. Our
work has certain limitations and further investigation is required, but already at this stage
our research calls for a closer collaboration between app engineers and icon designers. In
the context of p≡p, our work has triggered a deeper discussion on the icon design choices
and a potential revamp is on the way.
1 Introduction
This work reports on preliminary research where we questioned how users understand security
indicators—either used independently, or alongside text labels, or with explanations—that are
shown in an email application that offers end-to-end encryption1.
Security indicators are graphical clues or icons that, in secure email apps, are reserved to
tell users about two specific concepts: confidentiality of a message, meaning that an email is or
has been encrypted, and authenticity and integrity, meaning that the message is coming from a
trusted party, that is, from a party whose public key we hold and trust. Different choices exist
to express those concepts either in their positive and in their negative variants (e.g. violation of
confidentiality, untruthfulness of a party, and lack of any knowledge on the matter), but there
is no uniformity in how different apps should graphically convey those messages.
We investigate the question in the context of “Pretty Easy Privacy”2(p≡p), a relatively
new secure email app that attempts to deploy a traffic-light semantic as a “clear and easily
understandable presentation” of the different privacy states that messages and communication
peers can have[16]. The design choices regarding the indicators within p≡p diverge from those
1We will call such applications “secure email apps”, or “secure emails”
2https://www.pep.security/
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Figure 1: Enigmail security indicators
of other applications, and how this reflects on users has not been studied before. Furthermore,
other secure email apps also differ from one another. Overlooking that Lausch et al. [15] discuss
that an “envelope” in various conditions (e.g. broken, closed, open) is a better metaphor than a
“padlock” in its various forms (e.g. open or closed, and red or green-coloured), applications opt
for their own security icons and metaphors—for instance, the popular open-source Enigmail3
for Thunderbird uses padlocks for confidentiality and sealed envelopes for authentication and
integrity (see Figure 1). The reasoning underpinning choices is often not explicitly stated.
1.1 The hard quest for good security indicators
The lack of standards is surely not helping secure email designers to converge in choosing the
same security indicators. Part of the problem is the considerable amount of different situations
that arise when talking about email confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity: distinguishing
and representing all of them with icons, or with a combination of icons, does not have any
obvious solutions.
Even the choice of what is the right metaphor is unclear and, at least in the end-to-end
encryption case, it seems that metaphors do not help users understand the real functionality
of an application [3]. Thus, designers find themselves in the difficult position to either simplify
the message, at risk of paternalizing users (= not letting them be in control), or deliver a fully
fledged description, at risk of confusing them.
Recently the situation may have gotten worse. The General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) suggests the use of icons in order to give a meaningful overview of the intended
processing in an “easily visible, intelligible and clearly legible manner” (Art. 12.7) [8]. The
GDPR has renewed a general interest in security indicators. While most of them are variants of
padlocks and shields, many others are new, and more are expected to be proposed in response
to the GDPR call.
Without a common agreement on what security icons to use and in which circumstances,
having a large pool of icons to choose from may actually confuse app designers and users
alike. For example, research on security indicators in the context of web browsers, which has
been an active research area for almost two decades [4, 12], cautions that people don’t always
3https://www.enigmail.net
2
Evaluating ambiguity of privacy indicators in a secure email app Stojkovski et Lenzini
understand security indicators. In contrast to the pictograms of bio or chemical hazards, which
are standardized internationally by the Globally Harmonized System [17], at the moment there
is no equivalent agreement that can characterize what security ‘hazards’ are and how they can
be represented.
And, unlike written texts for which tests of understandability exist, icons do not have an
accepted intelligibility test. Thus, secure email engineers have to find their ways without clear
guidelines and instruments for the design of security indicators.
Even in the case of security applications that have been available for decades, like secure
email apps, there is still room for improvement. Our investigation brings up some data that can
revive a discussion about the pros and cons of certain design choices in this application domain.
By shedding light on the use of the traffic-light semantic within a new system that aspires
to bring “crypto to the masses”, our work contributes to the discourse on the usability and
effectiveness of security and privacy indicators, which in the secure email context has received
relatively little attention.
2 Background and Research Questions
p≡p is an opportunistic peer-to-peer end-to-end encryption software which tries to unburden
users from managing their encryption keys. p≡p automatically generates user keys, appends
the public key to each outgoing message, and extracts and stores keys from incoming messages.
Messages are automatically encrypted and decrypted. Peers can be verified to be authentic by a
second-channel out-of-bound communication, e.g. a phone call where the peers verify a human-
friendly version of their fingerprint; this version is a sequence of easily readable words, called
trustwords, taken from a dictionary according to an index that depends on the combination of
the two peers’ fingerprints.
Depending on several factors, each communication channel to different peers may have a
different privacy status. For example, the system can independently and automatically cate-
gorise a particular message as reliable whenever it can be encrypted or decrypted with sufficient
cryptographic parameters. However, the system cannot independently categorise the message
as trusted unless the user carries out a p≡p handshake and confirms to trust the sender in the
p≡p interface.
Internally, p≡p distinguishes among 13 situations which are surjectively mapped into colour
codes
(chosen according to a traffic light semantics), privacy rating labels, as well as corresponding
privacy rating explanations [16]. Table 1 provides an overview of the different internal ratings,
codes and labels. Table 2 provides an overview of how these ratings are currently displayed in
the user interface of p≡p for Thunderbird.
For instance, the p≡p rating “mistrust” is assigned the colour code “red”, the user inter-
face label “Mistrusted”, and explanation “This message has a communication partner that has
previously been marked as mistrusted”.
In addition, p≡p uses privacy indicators which are icons from an icon set made up of four
coloured shapes (e.g. see Figure 2 and Figure 3) corresponding to the colour code assigned to
each situation. “Under Attack”, “Broken”, and “Mistrusted” are the situations represented by a
red square, for instance. The rating codes from 0 to 5 are not assigned any colour label, however,
in the user interface, these codes are represented by a gray circle. Reliable communication (i.e.
rating code 6 ) is represented using a yellow shape, and trusted communication (i.e. colour code
7 ) is represented with a green shape.
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Rating Code Rating Label Colour code Colour Label
-3 under attack -1 red
-2 broken -1 red
-1 mistrust -1 red
0 undefined 0 no colour
1 cannot decrypt 0 no colour
2 have no key 0 no colour
3 unencrypted 0 no colour
4 unencrypted for some 0 no colour
5 unreliable 0 no colour
6 reliable 1 yellow
7 trusted 2 green
8 trusted and anonymized 2 green
9 fully anonymous 2 green








This message is not secure and
has been tampered with.
-2 Broken
This message has broken
encryption or formatting.
-1 Mistrusted
This message has a communication partner
that has previously been marked as mistrusted.
0 Unknown
This message does not contain enough
information to determine if it is secure.
1 Cannot Decrypt
This message cannot be decrypted
because the key is not available.
3 Unsecure This message is unsecure.
4 Unsecure for Some
This message is unsecure for
some communication partners.
5 Unreliable Security This message has unreliable protection.
6 Secure
This message is secure but you still need to verify
the identity of your communication partner.
7 Secure & Trusted This message is secure and trusted.
Table 2: Overview of the privacy ratings as displayed in the UI of p≡p for Thunderbird
The design choice of p≡p’s privacy icons is justified by arguments, but not by evidence.
While discussing with the p≡p developers, we were told that the shapes are meant to be easily
understood by colour-blind persons, and were suggested after consultation with experts. The
colour choices are meant to reflect the universally-deployed traffic light semantic.
There are many interesting questions that could be investigated, such as, how to draw user
attention to these indicators; where to display those icons in the user interface; what situations
do such shapes suggest to users; are shapes better than conventional icons (e.g. envelopes), etc.
Nevertheless, here we conduct an enquiry into the most basic question of “how would
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Figure 2: p≡p for Thunderbird, privacy indicators
prospective or first-time p≡p users understand the p≡p privacy indicators”. Formally stated,
we intend to shed light on the following research questions:
1. Which of the 4 visual icons do users associate with the different p≡p privacy ratings?
2. Which of the 4 visual icons do users associate with the different p≡p privacy rating
explanations?
3 Methodology
We conducted three online studies to assess how people would interpret the various privacy
rating indicators offered by the p≡p email encryption system. Table 3 provides an overview of
the user test sessions, the number of participants per session as well as the focus of investigation.
Privacy Privacy Rating Number of
Ratings Explanations Participants
Session 1 × 16
Session 2 × × 12
Session 3 × × 14
Total evaluations 42 26
Table 3: User Test Sessions
3.1 Study structure
The first part of the study contained a block of 10 questions which asked participants to
choose an icon which according to them best corresponds to a given privacy statement i.e.
rating (see Figure 3 upper part for an example). The second part of the study similarly asked
the participants to match an icon to a privacy rating explanation (see Figure 3 lower part).
The last part of the study asked about demographics. The 10 privacy rating statements and
explanations were drawn from the p≡p for Thunderbird distribution (Enigmail/p≡p version
2.0.12 (20190707-1417). To minimize order bias, the sequence of all questions per block was
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Figure 3: Sample questions asking participants to choose the icon which according to them
best corresponds to a privacy statement i.e. rating (upper question), and a privacy rating
explanation (lower question)
randomized for each test participant. The order of all answer choices (icons) per question was
also randomized. The studies were administered via Qualtrics4.
3.2 Participants
All participants are relatively tech-savvy, with at least a Bachelor’s degree. The participants of
Session 1 and 2 are based in Luxembourg and were recruited at the University of Luxembourg
via an email invitation to participate in a pilot study (Session 1) and during a lecture on
Security Engineering (Session 2). No incentive was offered to the participants of Sessions 1 and
2. The participants of Session 3 are based in different European countries and were recruited
in Portugal during a workshop on User Experience in security and privacy-critical systems. As
a compensation for their participation in the study, all participants of Session 3 were offered a
commercial license of p≡p for continued use of their paid apps i.e. the Outlook and Android
distributions.
3.3 Analysis
We performed a comparative analysis to understand if our participants associated icons to the
various privacy ratings and explanations in the same way as implemented by p≡p. If the icon
chosen by the majority of participants is the same as the one chosen by p≡p, the alignment
test for that rating or explanation equals “MATCH”, and otherwise “NO MATCH”.
The Match strength refers to how many participants selected the same icon as p≡p. Hence,
the higher the match, the narrower the gap between what the developers wanted to communicate
via the system and what the users understood. Similarly, the lower the match, the higher the
ambiguity of the intended privacy indicator.
4https://www.qualtrics.com
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4 Results
Figure 4 summarizes the participant responses, detailing the distribution of votes per icon for
each rating statement and explanation. The distribution under the most voted icon by the
participants is formatted in bold letters. The number of people that have voted for the same
icon as currently implemented in p≡p is underlined. Hence, in case of a match, the distribution
of the icon is formatted as bold and underlined.
These preliminary results highlight profound differences in what p≡p tries to convey to users
in terms of the security and privacy rating of messages and how prospective or first-time p≡p
users would interpret those ratings. The icon displayed by p≡p matches the association made
by the test participants in only 4 out of 10 cases. When it comes to rating explanations, there
is a match only in 3 out of 10 cases. There is additionally the internal inconsistency in the case
of Items 2, 4 and 9 where either the statement or the corresponding explanation match the icon
choice, and not both.
While we notice a strong alignment between the p≡p and participants’ choice in the case of
a fully secure rating (Item 10), the alignment is less strong on the other end of the spectrum
(Items 1 and 2). In all other cases (except for Item 4) the associations people make are different
from the intentions of the designer. This is even more worrying given the fact such indicators
will very likely be shown before the ones on the extremes of the rating spectrum (e.g. existing
email messages or those received/sent unencrypted after installing p≡p have the privacy rating
“Unsecure”).
The match strength is the lowest (=0%) in the case of RQ1-Item 9. The results suggest
that if p≡p displayed a yellow triangle as a visual indicator of a privacy rating for a message,
no prospective or first-time user would associate it with a “Secure” status, which is contrary to
what p≡p tries to communicate. This is probably not too surprising given our constant pattern
recognition efforts [10] in combination with the ubiquity of the triangle in hazard alerting or
warning symbols [21]. Unfortunately, without a deeper understanding of how secure email
works or additional context, such as an explanation (RQ2-Item 9), it is hard to foresee why
p≡p is trying to denote that the message is “Secure”, yet cautiously.
5 Discussion
Understanding why there is a dichotomy between what the developers wanted to convey with
the different privacy indicators in p≡p and how prospective users would interpret them, or
which privacy indicators could be better in narrowing this chasm, is not in the scope of this
investigation. Nevertheless, we hypothesize that the following elements potentially play a role:
• the shapes of the indicators
• the colours of the indicators
• the traffic light metaphor used for the indicators
• the choice of words in the statements and explanations
• the perception of risk associated with the shapes, colours, metaphor and wordings of the
indicators
• the clustering of risks
• the understandability of the indicators
• the awareness and concern about different scenarios and privacy ratings
7
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Figure 4: Results of the preliminary investigation of alignment between participants’ associa-
tions of p≡p privacy ratings, explanations and visual icons against the actual associations as
implemented in several applications of p≡p.
(For each item, the match strength refers to the percentage of participants that associ-
ated an icon to a statement or explanation in the same fashion as it is currently implemented
by p≡p.)
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It is often the case that visual input tends to dominate other modalities when it comes to our
perceptual and memorial judgements [18]. Colour is one of the characteristics of human visual
perception that can carry important meaning and can have an important impact on people’s
affect, cognition, and behaviour [6]. According to Elliot & Maier’s colour-in-context theory [5],
some colour meanings and effects are biologically-based, while others are posited to stem from
the repeated pairing of colour and particular concepts, messages, and experiences. They state
that observing colour-meaning associations over time and cultures can contribute to reinforcing
and extending the applicability of those links to objects in the broader environment, such as
signs and signals. We did not have the opportunity to perform this investigation with existing
p≡p users. We would be interested in comparing such results with the current findings and
looking at the role of experience with the system on the interpretation of the privacy ratings
and indicators.
Disregarding some regional variations, traffic signs and traffic lights are now found all over
the world, and their meaning is internationally recognizable. The corresponding traffic light
rating system (red, amber, green) is something we have repurposed in many different domains,
from nutrition labels for pre-packed products [22] to energy consumption labeling [9] and project
management status reporting [7], to name a few. In that respect, the provision of the traffic light
colour codes can serve to communicate more accurate, relevant, and comparable information
to users, as well as to transmit certain levels of risk or allow for a quick recognition of potential
hazards.
Nevertheless, while signs and pictograms have been standardized in specific areas, in many
different contexts harmonized communication or a shared understanding of the risk communi-
cated by signs, symbols, or colours cannot be taken for granted [21]. The reasons can range
from cross-cultural differences [14] to varying levels of technical expertise within a specific do-
main. Research on human aspects in the context of end-to-end email encryption suggests that
non-expert users have incomplete threat models and a general absence of understanding of the
email architecture [19]. As expressed in Section 1, the number of different situations that arise
in secure email is not so small. Deciding which ones and how many to represent graphically, as
well as, which metaphor to use, is not an easy choice. There is probably not a straightforward
answer and there is definitely not a unique one. There are differing views about how transparent
should systems for end-to-end email encryption be [1], [20]. In the case of Item 9, it is evident
that p≡p attempts to find the balance between these two approaches: on the one hand they
would like to instill a sense of security provided by the automatic end-to-end encryption akin
to other secure messaging and emailing systems, but on the other hand, they would still like
to warn the user of potential threats such as a man-in-the-middle attack that they could be
susceptible to if they do not verify the corresponding party via a second secure channel (e.g.
by comparing the trustwords in person or over the phone).
While over time, we are likely going to recognize more consistency in the symbols used
by security and privacy-critical systems, widely-available UI kits or even standardized icon
sets, in the immediate term, developers of such systems should devote an equal amount of
attention and resources to understanding their (target) users and the different dimensions and
requirements of their socio-technical proposition. As a starting point, developers, and especially
teams without user research/UX profiles, should inform themselves of the general paradigms
and design principles that align security and usability [23, 13], followed by more recent lessons
learnt in this highly-challenging domain that brings together the usable security, HCI and UX
disciplines. Fine-grained inspiration could perhaps be drawn from the vast body of work on
browser security indicators and warnings (e.g. [11]), in particular, the incremental user-centred
approach where proposed designs and changes were validated with thousands of users. Caplin’s
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book [2] could potentially be a useful reference to some developers in the specific context of
icons in computer interface design, however, as pointed out by Felt et al. ”Millions of Internet
users have recently come online via smartphones without learning ’standard’ iconography from
desktop browsers” [11], thus it is important to acknowledge that the expectations of users in
terms of interfaces are not necessarily associated with desktop computing and, in many cases,
obsolete metaphors.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We reported on a 42-participant study of users’ perceptions of email privacy ratings in the
context of pretty Easy privacy. Although our preliminary study has an evident limitation
mainly due to the limited sample size, the outcome suggests that prospective or first-time p≡p
users would have a difficulty understanding the privacy information communicated by p≡p.
The findings call for a broader and deeper investigation that would seek to assert which
design choices in terms of the privacy rating statement, explanation and visual icon (shape,
colour, metaphor etc.) would need to be reconsidered if p≡p would like to accurately commu-
nicate the degree of protection that it offers to its users as they send and receive email through
its system bearing in mind their experience, awareness and concerns. Our work has triggered
a deeper discussion at p≡p on the existing icon design choices and a potential overhaul of the
privacy indicators is being deliberated.
From a broader perspective we believe that further and more holistic analyses of the different
secure communication systems would be needed in order to identify the different types and
degrees of security information communicated by those systems, the effectiveness of the deployed
security and privacy indicators as well as their suitability for target audiences with different
characteristics and levels of expertise.
We are of the opinion that despite looking trivial, this interaction experience should not
be in the way of users adopting systems for end-to-end email encryption, let alone a source of
confusion or frustration that could result in unsecure behavior or unwanted leakage of confi-
dential information. This is particularly relevant within an organizational setting, where policy
and culture may also contribute towards the way users go about employing end-to-end email
encryption.
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